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| 16 | UNITED STATES | DISTRICT COURT |
| 17 | CENTRAL DISTRI | CT OF CALIFORNIA |
| 18 | NEWCASTLE COURTYARDS, LLC, | Case No. 2:23-CV-00104-JAK-AS |
| 19 | a California limited liability company; JONATHAN BENABOU, as Trustee | DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS |
| 20 | on behalf of THE MANI BENABOU FAMILY TRUST; and ROES 1 | ANGELES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN |
| 21 | through 500, | SUPPORT OF RULE 12(B)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST |
| 22 | Plaintiffs and Petitioners, v. | AMENDED COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO STAY |
| 23 | CITY OF LOS ANGELES; COUNTY | Date: May 1, 2023 |
| 24 | OF LOS ANGELES; COUNT OF LOST ANGELES RECORDER'S | Time: 8:30 AM JFP: Honorable John A. Kronstadt 1st St, CH – "10B" |
| 25 | OFFICE; DOES 1 through 500; and ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE MATTER of the ULA and all | Action Filed: January 6, 2023 |
| 26 | proceedings related thereto, | Trial Date: TBD |
| 27 | Defendants and Respondents. | |
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I. INTRODUCTION

At the November 8, 2022 election, the City's voters exercised their inherent, legislative power of initiative to adopt Measure ULA, a citizen-sponsored initiative imposing taxes to fund affordable housing and tenant assistance programs, and thereby to prevent and remedy homelessness. Measure ULA passed with nearly 58% voter approval.

Having lost at the ballot box, Plaintiffs Newcastle Courtyards, LLC and Jonathan Benabou (collectively, "Newcastle") seek to use this Court to undo the voters' will and prevent the City from addressing the needs of tens of thousands of Angelenos who lack any housing, as well as those who lack adequate housing.

None of the alleged violations of law claimed by Newcastle has any merit. But this Court need not, indeed must not, consider Newcastle's unfounded claims. The reason is plain: Newcastle lacks any basis to seek to invoke this Court's jurisdiction.

First, the Tax Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 1341) and comity principles prohibit challenges to state and local taxes in federal court, irrespective of whether the challenger claims violations of federal or state law. A narrow, inapplicable exception applies if the state courts do not provide an adequate forum to litigate the challenge.

Here, Newcastle and other opponents of Measure ULA are already pursuing litigation in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, seeking to invalidate Measure ULA – on the very same grounds as Newcastle alleges herein. The Superior Court has already obtained jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.¹

The Superior Court provides a more-than-adequate forum – indeed, the only proper forum – for the challengers to seek to litigate their claims. And the City

¹ The two pending state court cases are currently pending before the Honorable Curtis Kin, who deemed them related at a March 10, 2023 Status Conference.

looks forward to demonstrating in the state court proceedings that the challengers' contentions lack merit, thereby defeating the challengers' efforts to eviscerate the voters' exercise of their inherent, legislative power of initiative and to interfere with the City's provision of housing-support services the voters have chosen to fund.

Thus, this Court should dismiss this case under the Taxpayer Injunction Act and comity principles.

Second, under Supreme Court precedent commonly known as the *Colorado River* Doctrine, Newcastle may not invoke this Court's jurisdiction to litigate claims for which the Superior Court already has jurisdiction. Given the pending Superior Court proceedings and other relevant factors – including Newcastle's blatant forum shopping – this Court should dismiss this case (or, alternatively, issue a stay).

Third, Newcastle has failed to comply with statutory requirements, which Newcastle invoke, for commencing litigation seeking to invalidate Measure ULA, including requirements to provide notice that persons interested in the subject matter may join this suit, either to defend or challenge Measure ULA. Thus, the Court can and should dismiss this case on this additional ground.

For each of these independently dispositive reasons, this Court should grant the City's motion to dismiss Newcastle's suit (or to stay, a secondary, alternative remedy under the *Colorado River* Doctrine).

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. The City's Voters Approve Measure ULA to Fund Affordable Housing and Tenant Assistance Programs, and to Combat Homelessness.

On November 8, 2022, the City's voters approved a citizen-sponsored initiative, Measure ULA, imposing real property transfer taxes (AKA documentary transfer taxes) on conveyances of real property interests over \$5,000,000, effective April 1, 2023. Measure ULA taxes may only be used to fund affordable housing and tenant assistance programs, and will help address the lack of adequate housing

for tens of thousands of Angelenos. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (Dkt. 14), ¶¶ 16, 17, 18, 109.

B. HJTA Files a Reverse Validation Action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court; the Superior Court Secures Jurisdiction on February 15, 2023.

On December 21, 2022, the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association and the Apartment Association of Greater Los Angeles (collectively, "HJTA") filed suit in Los Angeles County Superior Court challenging the validity of Measure ULA. Specifically, HJTA filed a "reverse validation" action pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure sections 860 – 870.5 ("Validation Proceeding Statutes") and California Government Code section 50077.5. HJTA's principal claim is that Measure ULA is an unlawful "special tax" under Article XIIIA, section 4 of the California Constitution (added by Proposition 13 in 1979). Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exh. 1 (Complaint in *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association et al. v. City of Los Angeles and All Persons Interested in the Matter of Measure ULA.*, Los Angeles Cnty. Super. Ct. Case No. 22STCV39662).

As discussed below, a validation action is an *in rem* proceeding which can be initiated either by a public agency or an interested person. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 860, 863. Through the validation proceeding, the public agency and interested persons can conclusively determine, in "a single dispositive final judgment," the legality of certain governmental actions. *Friedland v. City of Long Beach*, 62 Cal.App.4th 835, 842 (1998) (quoting *Committee for Responsible Planning v. City of Indian Wells*, 225 Cal.App.3d 191, 197-98 (1990)). Interested persons may appear either to defend the validity of the subject matter, or to pursue constitutional and/or non-constitutional challenges, as well as various remedies, *e.g.*, writ of mandate or declaratory relief. *See* Section III-A-2 below.

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² The California Constitution defines as "special tax" as "any tax imposed for specific purposes, including a tax imposed for specific purposes, which is placed into a general fund." Cal. Const. art. 13C, § 1(d).

Early in the validation proceedings, the court secures jurisdiction over the subject matter – the *res* – after (1) the plaintiff satisfies service and publication of summons requirements for providing notice to any interested persons, and (2) the deadline specified in the summons for interested persons to answer has passed. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 861, 861.1, 862, 863.³

Where a "reverse validation" action is brought by a challenger, the plaintiff shall name the public agency as a defendant and serve it with a standard summons. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 863.

In the HJTA case, HJTA served the City and published the summons providing notice to any and all interested persons that the deadline to answer was February 15, 2023 (whether they answer for or against Measure ULA). The City answered on February 10, 2023. RJN, Exh. 2. The Superior Court secured jurisdiction over Measure ULA as of February 15, 2023, the deadline for interested persons to respond, pursuant to sections 861, 861.1, 862, and 863 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. RJN, Exh. 3.

C. Newcastle Files Duplicative State and Federal Actions, and Does Not Timely or Properly Endeavor to Publish Summons in Its Federal Court Action.

Meanwhile, on January 6, 2023, Newcastle filed duplicate reverse validation actions, one in this Court (Dkt. 1) and one in the same Los Angeles County Superior Court where the HJTA case is pending. RJN, Exh. 4 (Complaint in Newcastle Courtyards, LLC, et. al. v. City of Los Angeles, et. al and All Persons Interested in the Matter of the ULA, Los Angeles Cnty. Super. Ct. Case

³ To secure the court's jurisdiction, (1) the plaintiff must publish summons pursuant to California Government Code section 6063 (Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 861), (2) the summons must be "directed to 'all persons interested in the matter'" (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 861.1, 863), (3) the summons must specifically state the deadline for any interested persons to answer, which "shall be 10 or more days after completion of publication of the summons" (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 861.1), and (4) the plaintiff must file proof of completion of publication within 60 days of filing suit (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 863). "Jurisdiction shall be complete after the date specified in the summons." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 862.

No. 23STCV00352). Like HJTA, Newcastle alleges, in its duplicative complaints, that Measure ULA is an unlawful special tax. *E.g.*, Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 100-103, 109; RJN, Exh. 4, ¶¶ 100-103, 109. Newcastle also includes additional claims for relief, *e.g.*, equal protection, due process, and takings claims. *See* Dkt. 1, ¶ 57 et seq., ¶ 134 et seq., and ¶ 216; RJN, Exh. 4, ¶ 57 et seq., ¶ 134 et seq., and ¶ 216.⁴

In Newcastle's Superior Court action, City answered on February 21, 2023. RJN, Exh. 6. That same day, Newcastle commenced publication of summons,

RJN, Exh. 6. That same day, Newcastle commenced publication of summons, which specified that March 14, 2023, was the last day for any interested person to appear and answer their complaint. RJN, Exh. 7.

In this action, Newcastle never served the City with their original complaint. Instead, on February 10 and 22, Newcastle filed and served, respectively, their First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 14). The FAC re-alleges that Measure ULA is an unlawful special tax (¶¶ 127-131, 137), re-alleges Newcastle's other claims for relief, e.g., equal protection, due process, and takings claims (¶¶ 68-105, 162-216, 225-228), and adds a Commerce Cause claim (¶¶ 236-39).

On February 10, 2023 (35 days after filing suit), Newcastle applied *ex parte* in this Court for an order authorizing publication of summons. Dkt. 15. On February 21 and 24, this Court authorized publication and issued the summons, which identifies March 27, 2023, as the last day to answer. Dkt. 22, 26. Newcastle did not file proof of service of completion of publication within 60 days of filing suit (that is, by March 7, 2023), as required by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 863.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARDS

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court generally considers only those

⁴ In the Notice of Related Case Newcastle filed in the Superior Court, Newcastle admitted that "[t]he related federal and state actions involve all or a material part of the subject matter of this proceeding, as the causes of action herein [Newcastle's state court action] are substantially the same as the claims for relief at issue in the related state and federal proceedings, and involve essentially the same legal issues, transactions, and occurrences, and arise out of the same set of operative facts." RJN, Exh. 5, Attachment 1h-2h.

allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice. *Outdoor Media Group, Inc. v. City of Beaumont*, 506 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2007). A court may consider matters of judicial notice without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. *United States v. Ritchie*, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

A defendant may move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Tax Injunction Act and Comity Principles Bar this Action.

1. The Tax Injunction Act and Comity Preclude Challenges to State and Local Taxes.

The Tax Injunction Act ("TIA") commands that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. This prohibition includes challenges to local taxes. *Qwest Corp. v. City of Surprise*, 434 F.3d 1176, 1184 (9th Cir. 2006) (dismissing challenge to city taxes); *Lowe v. Washoe Cnty.*, 627 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2010) (dismissing challenge to county taxes).

This statutory prohibition encompasses claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, which advances "the principal purpose of the Tax Injunction Act: 'to limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.'" *California v. Grace Brethren Church*, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982) ("*Grace Brethren Church*").

Damage claims are also barred, pursuant to common law comity principles, which are reflected in the TIA and provide an independent, further-reaching proscription against challenges to the validity of state taxes. *Levin v. Com. Energy, Inc.*, 560 U.S. 413, 424, 432 (2010); *see also Fair Assessment in Real Est. Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary*, 454 U.S. 100, 107 (1981).

The prohibition further applies to federal constitutional claims challenging state and local taxes (or any other claims, for that matter). *Hyatt v. Yee*, 871 F.3d 1067, 1074 (9th Cir. 2017); *see also Kadva Patidar 42 Gam Samaj v. Cnty. of Riverside*, 777 F. App'x 215, 216 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing *Jerron W., Inc. v. State of Cal., State Bd. of Equalization*, 129 F.3d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1997)); *ANR Pipeline Co. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n*, 646 F.3d 940, 947 (5th Cir. 2011).

The proscription is based, in part, on legislative and judicial recognition that federal courts should not intrude upon or disrupt a state's enforcement of its tax system. Fair Assessment in Real Est., 454 U.S. at 113-14; Jerron W., Inc. v. State of Cal., State Bd. of Equalization, 129 F.3d 1334, 1337 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Jan. 29, 1998)). The proscription is also based on the Supreme Court's recognition that "federal constitutional issues" a plaintiff may raise in a challenge to state and local taxes "are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state courts." Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 410 (quoting Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128, n. 17 (1971)).

The proscription is rarely breached.

The courts "must construe narrowly the 'plain, speedy and efficient' exception to the Tax Injunction Act." *Grace Brethren Church*, 457 U.S. at 413. The Ninth Circuit succinctly summarized the exception test:

For a remedy to be "plain," "the procedures available in state court must be certain." [fn.] A remedy is "efficient" "unless it imposes an 'unusual hardship ... requiring ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy.' "[fn.] A remedy is "speedy" "if it does not entail a significantly greater delay than a corresponding federal procedure." [fn.] To satisfy these requirements, a remedy "need not necessarily be the best remedy

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available or even equal to or better than the remedy which might be available in the federal courts."[fn.]

Hyatt, 871 F.3d at 1073 (omitting footnotes containing citations).⁵

The courts regularly reject exception claims under this narrowly-construed exception. *Id. at* 1078 (state requirement to pay taxes as prerequisite to suit satisfies plain-speedy-and-efficient-remedy standard, even when it is uncertain whether or how a challenger can raise federal constitutional claims); *Lowe*, 627 F.3d at 1155 (exception inapplicable, even though federal courts might provide a more efficient remedy); *Mandel v. Hutchinson*, 494 F.2d 364, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1974) (availability of right to sue in California courts to seek refund after paying tax under protest, or potentially to seek writ of mandate if suit for refund not available, provides sufficient state court remedy); *May Trucking*, 388 F.3d at 1272-74 (state courts provided opportunity to challenge taxes, including on constitutional grounds, even if payment required as prerequisite to suit for refund).

2. Newcastle's Federal Action Is Barred by the TIA and Comity.

Under the TIA and comity principles discussed above, there is no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over the validity of Measure ULA. Instead, the Los Angeles County Superior Court is the proper forum for any (presumptively) interested person, including Newcastle, to seek invalidation of Measure ULA.

Indeed, by pursuing a duplicative state court action, Newcastle has admitted it may pursue its claims in state court. They pleads the same claims in both courts, and conceded in the Notice of Related Case they filed in state court that their "federal and state actions involve all or a material part of the subject matter of this proceeding, as the causes of action herein [their state court action] are substantially

⁵ Likelihood of success in state court is not a factor. *May Trucking Co. v. Oregon Dep't of Transp.*, 388 F.3d 1261, 1272 (9th Cir. 2004); *see also Dillon v. State of Mont.*, 634 F.2d 463, 468 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Remedial certainty does not require that state courts have previously confronted similar facts and rendered therein the relief a plaintiff now seeks").

the same as the claims for relief at issue in the related state and federal proceedings, and involve essentially the same legal issues, transactions, and occurrences, and arise out of the same set of operative facts." RJN, Exh. 5, Attachment 1h-2h.

Moreover, Newcastle's state court case is further along than the instant action. The City has answered the Complaint. In addition, through the publication-of-summons process, Newcastle sought Superior Court jurisdiction over Measure ULA before endeavoring to do so in this Court (which it has not accomplished, as discussed in Section III-C-2 below). RJN, Exhs. 5, 6. Meanwhile, before Newcastle sought in either court to publish summons and seek jurisdiction over the *res* – Measure ULA – HJTA secured Superior Court jurisdiction, on February 15, 2023, over Measure ULA. RJN, Exhs. 2, 3.

Accordingly, Newcastle has admitted, and could not reasonably dispute, that the Superior Court is the proper forum to litigate their challenge to Measure ULA, and that the proscription against their federal court case, established by the TIA and comity principles, applies.

Nor could Newcastle show that they lack a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in state court.

Newcastle may pursue their challenges to Measure ULA in state court based on alleged violations of state and/or federal law, including constitutional law, and irrespective of the remedy they seek. *See*, *e.g.*, *Friedland*, 62 Cal.App.4th at 846-47; *Millbrae Sch. Dist. v. Superior Ct.*, 209 Cal.App.3d 1494 (1989); *Embarcadero Mun. Improvement District v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara*, 88 Cal.App.4th 781 (2001).⁶

California law requires validation actions to be promptly and efficiently

⁶ The theories of liability, or titles affixed to the claims for relief in state court, are irrelevant. "Any challenges to the validity of the governmental action must be raised in the validation proceeding." *N.T. Hill Inc. v. City of Fresno* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 977, 991, n. 10. The judgment is conclusive "as to all matters therein adjudicated or which at that time could have been adjudicated" Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 870(a); *see also Coachella Valley Water Dist. v. Superior Ct. of Riverside Cnty.*, 61 Cal.App.5th 755, 768 (2021).

resolved. "Actions brought pursuant to this chapter [Validation Proceeding Statutes] shall be given preference over all other civil actions before the court in the matter of setting the same for hearing or trial, and in hearing the same, to the end that such actions shall be speedily heard and determined." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 867. Indeed, it is in City's interest to ensure timely and efficient confirmation of the voters' inherent power of initiative to impose taxes, and their decision to provide funds to support affordable housing and tenant assistance programs, and thereby to prevent and remedy homelessness.

That Newcastle or any other challenger seeks to invalidate Measure ULA based on alleged violations of the United States Constitution is immaterial. See, e.g., Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 410; Hyatt, 871 F.3d at 1074; Kadva Patidar, 777 F. App'x at 216; ANR Pipeline, 646 F.3d at 947. California courts regularly decide cases in which plaintiffs allege equal protection, due process, and takings challenges to taxes and other charges. See, e.g., Volkswagen Pac., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal.3d 48, 58 (1972) (whether tax violated rights to equal protection and due process); Borikas v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., 214 Cal. App. 4th 135, 139-40 (2013) (same); City of Berkeley v. Cukierman, 14 Cal. App. 4th 1331, 1344 (1993) (same); City of Berkeley v. Oakland Raiders, 143 Cal. App. 3d 636, 638 (1983) (same); *Park 'N Fly of San Francisco, Inc. v. City of S.* San Francisco, 188 Cal.App.3d 1201, 1209 (1987) (whether tax violated equal protection); City of San Jose v. Donohue (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 40, 45 (whether exemption of public entities from tax violated equal protection); California Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of San Jose, 61 Cal.4th 435, 454-58 (2015) (whether fee constituted a taking under *Nollan / Dolan* unconstitutional exactions doctrine); *All*. for Responsible Plan. v. Taylor, 63 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1075 (2021) (same); 616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of W. Hollywood, 3 Cal.App.5th 621, 625-28 (2016) (same).

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Franchise Tax Bd., 237 Cal. App.4th 193, 198 (2015); Dan Clark Fam. Ltd. P'ship v. Miramontes, 193 Cal. App.4th 219, 234 (2011).

Accordingly, Newcastle may continue to seek to prove in the Superior Court that Measure ULA is invalid, but may not, pursuant to the TIA and comity principles, challenge the validity of Measure ULA in this Court.

B. The Colorado River Doctrine also Bars this Action.

1. The Colorado River Doctrine Bars Federal Court Actions that Raise Claims Already at Issue in State Court, Particularly Where the State Court First Acquired Jurisdiction.

Under the *Colorado River* Doctrine, district courts determine whether to dismiss, stay, or remand a case where there is a concurrent state court proceeding regarding the same subject matter. *Montanore Mins. Corp. v. Bakie*, 867 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2017), *as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc* (Oct. 18, 2017). It is not, strictly speaking, an abstention doctrine, but is based on principles of "wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation." *Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States*, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

District courts generally evaluate six factors: "(1) whether either the state or federal court has exercised jurisdiction over a *res*; (2) the inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation; [] (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction ... (5) whether federal or state law controls the decision on the merits; and (6) whether the state court can adequately protect the rights of the parties." *40235 Washington St. Corp. v. Lusardi*, 976 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1992).

The first factor is dispositive where a *res* is at issue, and the state court is the first to acquire jurisdiction over the *res*. "[I]t is legal error for a district court not to remand, dismiss, or stay federal proceedings on account of the state court's prior exercise of jurisdiction, and any decision on the merits must be vacated." *Chapman*

v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Tr. Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1044, n. 1 (9th Cir. 2011). Remand, dismissal, or stay is required because the state court has exclusive jurisdiction. *Id.* at 1043-45; see also State Eng'r of State of Nevada v. S. Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians of Nevada, 339 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2003) (trial court properly remanded); 40235 Washington St. Corp., 976 F.2d at 589 (district court properly stayed case); Montanore, 867 F.3d at 1166 (district court abused its discretion by not abstaining).⁷

In addition, the courts consider whether the plaintiff is forum shopping. *Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush*, 87 F.3d 290, 297 (9th Cir. 1996), *as amended* (Aug. 14, 1996). If the plaintiff is forum shopping, dismissal, rather than a stay, is proper. *Am. Int'l Underwriters (Philippines), Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co.*, 843 F.2d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 1988).

2. This Court Should Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay this Action.

Here, the Superior Court acquired jurisdiction over the *res*, Measure ULA, on February 15, 2023, the deadline for any interested person to answer pursuant to HJTA's published summons and the Validation Proceeding Statutes. RJN, Exh. 3. Alternatively, Superior Court jurisdiction over Measure ULA was arguably acquired on March 14, 2023, the date for any interested person to answer pursuant to Newcastle's published summons. RJN, Exh. 7.8

Moreover, the City has already submitted to the Superior Court's jurisdiction, having answered both HJTA's and Newcastle's state court complaints (RJN,

⁷ Abstention is required even if the plaintiff seeks both merits and declaratory relief. *Id*.

⁸ Ultimately, it is immaterial whether the Superior Court acquired jurisdiction over Measure ULA through HJTA's or Newcastle's actions. There will ultimately be a single, consolidated proceeding in the Superior Court in which interested persons may challenge the validity of Measure ULA (if, of course, they have satisfied pleading requirements). *See* Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 865 ("If more than one action is pending concerning similar contests which may be brought under this chapter, they shall be consolidated for trial").

Exhs. 2, 6), and will vigorously defend the legality of the voters' approval of Measure ULA against the challengers' claims.

Meanwhile, Newcastle delayed taking action in this federal case. Newcastle did not serve the City until February 22, 2023; did not commence publication of summons until on or after February 24, 2023; and stated in the summons that March 27, 2023 was the deadline for interested persons to file an answer, which is well after the deadlines stated in HJTA's and Newcastle's state court summonses.⁹

Thus, the Superior Court was the first to acquire jurisdiction over Measure ULA, the City, and any interested persons. Accordingly, the first factor is dispositive. Newcastle may not proceed with their duplicative federal court action since the Superior Court was the first to acquire jurisdiction. *Chapman*, 651 F.3d at 1044, n. 1; *State Eng'r of State of Nevada*, 339 F.3d at 808; *40235 Washington St. Corp.*, 976 F.2d at 589; *Montanore*, 867 F.3d at 1166.

In addition, Newcastle's filing of duplicative complaints demonstrates that they are forum shopping. When combined with the first factor, dismissal, rather than merely a stay, is warranted. *See Am. Int'l Underwriters*, 843 F.2d at 1259.¹⁰

Other factors support this conclusion.

Under the third factor, not exercising jurisdiction will avoid piecemeal litigation and prevent potentially inconsistent rulings. *R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co.*, 656 F.3d 966, 980 (9th Cir. 2011). The fourth factor – which court first obtained jurisdiction – is already resolved in support of the City's motion.

Under the fifth factor, the primary issue in these actions is whether Article XIIIA, section 4 of the California Constitution (added by Proposition 13 in 1979)

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⁹ As discussed in Section III-C below, Newcastle also did not satisfy the publication-of-summons requirements of the Validation Proceeding Statutes.

¹⁰ Substantial similarity is the standard, not "exact parallelism." *Nakash v. Marciano*, 882 F.2d 1411, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989). Newcastle's state and federal complaints are substantially similar (they are essentially identical, except that Newcastle added a Commerce Clause claim to the FAC filed herein).

| 1 | proscribed the voters' authority to adopt Measure ULA by citizens' initiative, or |
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| 2 | whether the voters properly exercised their inherent, reserved initiative authority |
| 3 | (enshrined in the California Constitution since 1911), as the California Court of |
| 4 | Appeal, First District, has twice ruled. 11 Given this primary, non-routine issue of |
| 5 | California constitutional law, abstention is warranted. <i>Montanore</i> , 867 F.3d at |
| 6 | 1168. |
| 7 | Finally, under the sixth factor, the California courts are capable of addressing |
| 8 | Newcastle's federal claims. <i>Id.</i> at 1169; R.R. St. & Co., 656 F.3d at 981; see also |
| 9 | Section III-A-2 above. |
| 10 | Accordingly, dismissal is warranted under the Colorado River Doctrine (or, |
| 11 | alternatively, a stay). |
| 12 | C. In addition, this Court Should Dismiss Under the Validation Proceeding Statutes. |
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| 14 | 1. Newcastle Was Obligated to Timely Publish Summons, file Proof of Publication, and Secure Jurisdiction. |
| 15 | The Validation Proceeding Statutes "apply to 'any matter which under any |
| 16 | other law is authorized to be determined pursuant to this chapter." Plan. & |
| 17 | Conservation League v. Dep't of Water Res., 17 Cal.4th 264, 269 (quoting Cal. Civ. |
| 18 | Proc. Code § 860). |
| 19 | Here, California Government Code section 50077.5(a) provides that any |
| 20 | challenge to a voter-approved ordinance imposing a special tax shall be brought |

ovides that any challenge to a voter-approved ordinance imposing a special tax shall be brought pursuant to the Validating Proceeding Statutes.¹² Newcastle has so acknowledged,

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¹¹ Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 60 Cal.App.5th 227, (2021), as modified on denial of reh'g (Feb. 22, 2021); City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. All Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C, 51 Cal.App.5th 703 (2020).

¹² Subdivision (a) of Section 80077.5 states in pertinent part: "Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 860) of Title 10 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to any judicial action or proceeding to validate, attack, review, set aside, void, or annul an ordinance or resolution approved by the voters pursuant to this article on or after January 1, 1986, that levies a special tax, or modifies or amends an existing ordinance or resolution that levies a special tax."

by alleging that the Validation Proceeding Statutes apply (e.g., Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 8, 15, 239, and Dkt. 14, ¶¶ 6, 13, 265), and in their $ex\ parte$ application for publication of summons. Dkt. 22, p. 2:15-18 ("This application is made on the grounds that, as this suit includes a 'reverse validation' action, Cal. Government Code section 50077.5 requires Plaintiffs' lawsuit to be brought as a reverse validation action against 'all persons' pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. section 860 et seq.").

The plaintiff must publish the summons pursuant to California Government Code section 6063. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 861, 861.1, and 863. Government Code section 6063 requires the summons to be published "once a week for three successive weeks." The published summons must state the date by which answers must be filed. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 861. 861.1. Pursuant to these statutes, the published date by which answers are due must be at least 31 days after the first publication (minimum of 21 days of published notice plus 10 days to respond after completion of publication period). *Katz v. Campbell Union High Sch. Dist.*, 144 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1030 (2006).

A challenger's "[f]ailure to publish a summons in accordance with the statutory requirements ... deprives the court of the power to rule upon the matter." *Id.* at 1032. If the challenger "fails to complete the publication ... and to file proof thereof in the action within 60 days from the filing of his complaint, the action shall be forthwith dismissed on the motion of the public agency unless good cause for such failure is shown by the interested person." *Id.* at 1028 (2006) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 863).

2. Newcastle Did Not Timely Act to Secure Jurisdiction in this Court.

Here, 35 days after filing suit, Newcastle belatedly applied *ex parte* for an order to publish summons. Newcastle first published the summons on or after February 24, 2023, which summons specifies March 27, 2023 as the deadline for interested persons to answer. RJN, Exh. 8.

Newcastle did not file proof of publication within 60 days of filing suit (that

is, by March 7), as required by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 863. By delaying any effort to publish the summons for over one month, Newcastle unduly caused this failure to satisfy the publication-of-summon requirements.

As a consequence, dismissal is warranted. *Katz*, 144 Cal.App.4th at 1030, 1036 (trial court properly dismissed reverse validation because plaintiff did not properly specify date for interested persons to file answer, and neither plaintiff's mistake of law nor lack of prejudice constituted good cause to relieve plaintiff of mistake); *Protect Agric. Land v. Stanislaus Cnty. Loc. Agency Formation Com.*, 223 Cal.App.4th 550, 561-63 (2014) (plaintiff's failure to publish summons pursuant to Validation Proceeding Statutes based on mistake of law did not provide good cause to relieve them of duty; dismissal affirmed).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant the City's motion and dismiss this case (or, alternatively, to stay).

16 Dated: March 15, 2023

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LOCAL RULE 11-6.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned, counsel of record for Defendant City of Los Angeles, certifies that this brief contains 5,1561 words, which complies with the word limit of L.R. 11-6.1.

Kevin D. Siegel

PROOF OF SERVICE 1 I, Paola Mendez-Ruiz, declare: 2 I am a citizen of the United States and employed in San Francisco County, 3 4 California. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within-entitled 5 action. My business address is 1 California Street, Suite 3050, San Francisco, California 94111-5432. On March 15, 2022, I served a copy of the within 6 7 document(s): 8 DEFENDANT CITY OF LOS ANGELES' MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND **AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF RULE 12(B)(1) MOTION TO DISMISS** 9 FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT OR, ALTERNATIVELY, TO STAY 10 11 by transmitting via my electronic service address (pmruiz@bwslaw.com) the document(s) listed above to the person(s) at X 12 the e-mail address(es) set forth below. 13 Keith M. Fromm Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 14 LAW OFFICES OF KEITH M. FROMM Petitioners Newcastle Courtyards. LLC, and Jonathan Benabou, as 907 Westwood Blvd., Suite 442 15 Los Angeles, CA 90024 Trustee on behalf of The Mani 16 Tel: (310) 500-9960 Benabou Family Trust 17 E-mail: keithfromm@aol.com 18 Jeffrey Lee Costell 19 Joshua S. Stambaugh Sara M. McDuffie 20 COSTELL & ADELSON LAW CORP. 21 100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 700 Santa Monica, CA 90401 22 Tel: (310) 458-5959 23 E-mail: ilcostell@costell-law.com; jstambaugh@costell-law.com; 24 smcduffie@costell-law.com 25 26 27 28

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I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing 1 2 correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the 3 ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service 4 is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than 5 one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit. 6 7 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct. 8 Executed on March 15, 2022, at San Francisco, California. 9 10 11 12 Paola Mendez-Ruiz 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

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